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CONFLICT OF LAWS June. 1966 
I. 
DIR~CTIONS: (a) Use the forln provided, not your bluebook. for answering this 
portlon of tl:le examination. (b) Each correct answer will count 1/2 point for you; 
each·ir.c0rrect one will count an equal arr-.ount against you, whUe an unan~red 
question will not count at all. The:"efore, do!l£!.. ar.swer a question at all unless 
reasonably sure you are ·_'ight. (c) Nlco.rk each true statelnent "T" and eac~ false 
statement IIF". . Choose the answer that seer~lS mos~ generally 
right. where a completely correct answer is not possible; do not add explanation. 
(d) Assume, unless otherwise stated, that the jurisdictions involved are States 
of the United St?tes. 
1. Reasons of forUIn public. policy justify F2 in refusing to enforce a valid Fl 
judgment of the type normally enforceable in sister-States. ( 
2. F may refuse, for reasons of forwn public policy, to enforce rights arising 
under a sister-State statute. ( ) 
3. Renvoi is a favored doctrine in the United States, and is therefore applicable 
to most conflict of laws pro1-lems here. ( ) 
4. Renvoi is unknown outside the Unhed States. ( 
5. Situs law governs title to real property. 
6. Pearson v Northeast Airlines. used the salne rationale as Kilberg v North-
east AU'lines. ( ) 
7. Domicile is a concept of increasing importance in conflict of laws. ( 
8. Theoretically, an executor or administrator has: no existence as such outside 
the State of his appointment. 
9. Babcock v Jackson follows o:.·thodox choice -of-law rules. 
10. An Fl judgment in personam need not be respected in F2 if Fl jurisdiction 
over the defendant, a nonresident of Fl not in Fl at the time, had been ob-
tained by service by publication. ( ) 
11. Under older conflicts rules, an Fl judgment requiring future periodic pay-
ment of alimony had to be given full effect when sued on in F2. ( ) 
12. An Fl judgme1'lt of a type normally enforceable in sister-States will be 
rendered unenforceable in F2 by the fact that it was based upon a misinter-
pretation of F2 law. ( ) 
13. The forum will usually enforce the criminal judgments of a sister-State. 
14. An F 1 judgment containing 
be collaterally-attacked in 
action. 
FIls explicit finding that it had jurisdiction can 
F2 for want of jurisdiction by a party to the Fl 
( ) 
15. The outcome of a case may depend upon the characterization of its cause of 
action. 
16. Characterization may depend upon the purpose for which it is done. 
17. The full faith and credit requirement of the United States Constitution pro-
vides an added sanction to the rule of res judicata. where an Fl judgment is 
sought to be enforced in F2. ( ) 
a 
18. A valid judgment need not be enforced in/sister-State ' whose courts do not 
have jurisdiction to decide domestic causes of action of the sort that formed 
the basis for that judgment. ( ) 
19. IIQualification Statutes II have to do with the doing of business by corporations 
in States othe r that those of incorporation. ( ) 
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20. Statutes of the State of incorporation normally govern intracorporate re-
lations. ( ) 
II. ~25 points) 
Mather. a Maryland resident domiciled in Maryland. was hired in Maryland 
by Colonial Electric Co. (a District of Columbia corporation; to work as an 
electrician on a housing project in Virginia for which Colonial was a subcon-
tractor ana Woodner Co. (a Virginia corporation) the principal contractor. While 
at work in Virg~nia. Mather was ordered to go into the District of Columbia with 
a Woodner Co. truck and Vvoo<h'vr Co. driver. to select and br~ng back some 
special switches. While in the Distl'ict of Columbia on this errand. Mather 
suffered serious inJuries in an accident caused by the negligence of this driver. 
Colonial carried workmen's com-pensation insurance for Mather's benefit 
under the Maryland. Virginia and District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation 
Act. Woodner le. d: workmen's compensation insurance for Mather's benefit under 
the Virginia and Maryland acts only. 
Under the Virglnia and Maryland acts. a principal contractor. at:! well as the 
subcontractor who employs the worker. is oIliable to pay any workman .•. any 
compensation under this artide which he would have been liable to pay if that 
workman had been immediately employed by him. II If the principal contractor 
dces not take out workmen's cOlTIpensation insurance he is subject to negligence 
suit:; by employees of his subcontractors; but \."hen th~ principal contractor does 
carry workmen's compensation insurance on the subcontractor's employee. he 
is relieved by the Maryland and Virginia statutes of any common law liability to 
the employees of his subcontractor. 
Under the D. C. Act the principal contractor is liable for the payment of 
workmen's compensation to employees of a subcontractor only if the subcon-
tractor has not hilnsel£ taken out workmen's compensation insurance. When an 
industrial injury occurs in the D. C •• and only the subcontractor has taken out 
insurance, the principal contractor is liable to suit for negligence brought by an 
employee of the subcontractor. Under these circumstances the D. C. Act gives 
an injured employee the right to elect. on notice to the Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner. to receive the compensation provided by the employer, or to 
recover damages against any third party (including the principal contractor) 
alleged to be liable. 
Mather elected to sue ·Woodner Co. as a third party in the U. S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, giving the required notice to the Commission-
er. In the trial court, Mather won a verdict and judgment for $60.000 damages, 
and Woodner Co. appeals. 
Vrhat conflict of laws issues arise in this case? How should the appellate 
court decide. and why? 
III. ( 25 points) 
On February 6, 1963. petitioner, a citizen of Ohio. filed her complaint in 
the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. claiming damages in ex-
cess of $10.000 for personal injuries resultL'lg from an autOlTIobile accident in 
South Carolina. allegedly caused by the negligence of one Osgood, a Massachu-
setts citizen, deceased at the time of filing the complaint. Respondent, Osgood's 
executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On Febru-
ary 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint 
with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with the rele-
vant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(d)(1). which provides: 
" The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff 
shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. 
Service shall be made as follows: 
"(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, 
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally 
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or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
th~rein ••.•• II 
Respondent filed his answer alid n'1otion for sUI .. :1.mary judgment on March 2. 
1963. alleging. inter alia. that the action could not be maintained because it had 
been brought "contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts 
General Laws (Tel'. Ed. ) Chapter 197. Section 9. (Noncompliance was later 
admitted b y petitioner.) That section provides: 
ITExcept as provided in this chapter. an executor or ac1ministrator shall 
not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which 
is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond fOJ: 
the performance of his trust, or to such action which is commenced 
within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such 
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor Or 
administrator or service thereof accepted by him or a notice sti'\ting 
the name of the eS '~ate, the name and addre r s of the creditor, tre amoUIt 
of the claim and the cOurt in which tl'.e action har been brought has been 
filed in the proper registry of probate ••..•• II Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann •• c. 197, sec. 9. (1958). 
(Respondent had filed bond as required by Section 9 on March l, 1962.) 
The Distr;ct Court granted re.::;t)ondent's nlOtion f-:>r summary judgment on 
the ground of inadequacy of the service under :tvfass. Sec. 9, supra; t~e Court 
of Appeals fnr the First Circuit affirmed. The U. S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. What result, and why? Why do these facts present a case that is 
markedly different to the usual diversity-jurisdiction case? 
IV. (20 points) 
Dean, plaintiff's intestate, died as a result of eating part of a can of d:'seased 
corned beef that he had bought frorn a local grocer in Ohio, of which he was a 
resident. The grocer had bought the meat from a wholesaler in Ohio, who had 
in turn. bought it from the defendant; the defendant, a New York resident, had 
imported it from South Amedca. where it was processed and canned by another 
concern. and shiI-ped it from New York, the port of ent r y, to the Ohio whole-
saler. 
The consequent wrongful death action was brought in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, i t s jurisdiction being based 
on diversity of citizenship. 
The plaintiff sought recove r y on the gl"ound that the defendant's negligence 
had caused the meat eo be poisonous. He offered no proof of actual fault, however, 
relying, instead, on section 12760 of the Ohio Code. That section provided: 
"Whoever sells, offers for sale or has in possession with intent to sell, diseased, 
corrupted, adulterated or unwholesome provisions without making the condition 
thereof known to the buyer, shall be fined or imprisoned. or both. 11 
Ohio decisions held that violation of this statute creates liability without 
negligence. New York has a similar statu~e .• 
Can the plaintiff recover, and, if so, why? Discuss. 
V. (20 points) 
In 1965, the plaintiff, SInith, a resident of State X, and the defendant, Brown, 
a resident of State Y, signed a gualanty agreement in which they jointly and seve-
rally guaranteed payment of a loan by the Ba nk of X (located at Junction City, X) 
to the U. S. Dingbat Corp. in the principal sum of $500, 000. Upon default in re-
payment of the loan, Smith, the guarantor residel1.t in X. was required to pay to 
the Bank of X the entire principal and interest due on the loan. Smith now seeks 
contribution from his co-guar antor, Brown. in a diversity action in the U. S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Y. 
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It is clear that the guaranty agreement is invaiid under the usury laws of Y, 
but valid under those of X. That a g reeme nt was signed by Bruwn in Y, but con-
templated by its express tel'ms acceptance by the extension of credit when it 
stated: II ••• all extension of credit ••• luad e b y Bank to bo!'rowe-r shall be conclu-
sively presumed to have been made in acceptance hereof. II 
What conflicts issues a ~· e there in this case? Who shou:d win? Why? 
